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Introduction 
"Truly I tell you, whateveryou didnot dofor one of the least of these, you 
did not do for me." 
- Matthew 25:45 
America is fortunate to have a long running and relatively stable 
democratic government, due in large part to the robustness of many of its 
democratic institutions. Analogically, one can describe democratic 
institutions as some of the individual threads comprising the fabric of a free 
society. Like the threads making up any fabric, democratic institutions are 
not all of equal size and strength, nor do they all serve the same function. In 
most fabrics, one thread will not make or break the whole. Some threads 
can be strained, worn down, or perhaps even broken, and the fabric will 
mostly maintain its form; however, we will still notice when it looks worse 
for the wear. Other threads, however, are so fundamental to the structure 
that if you remove or break them, the entire cloth will come apart. In a free 
society, some threads are actions, like voting or holding peaceful protests. 
Others are concrete institutions made up of groups of people, like the courts 
or legislatures. Still others are ideals, or cultural commitments - like the 
belief in due process, the rule of law, and the equal application of the law to 
all people. 
Department of Homeland Security v. New York' is a recent 
immigration case that exposes the function of three important threads. First, 
it invokes the power of federal district judges; they help shape national 
policy and protect the substantive and procedural due process rights of 
people subject to American law. Second, the case highlights a thread 
interwoven within the structure of the courts; our nation's immigration 
jurisprudence. Finally, it invokes an ideal: our nation's idea of how we 
should treat the disenfranchised and disadvantaged - the "least of these." 
Attached to the latter two is a fourth thread, pernicious and profoundly 
antidemocratic, yet endemic to America's past and current treatment of 
noncitizens: racism. 
Several areas of law test our commitment to democratic ideals and 
require us to fight against impulses, like racism, that would erode their 
foundations. Immigration law is one such area. Like election law, 
immigration law exposes a "deep interplay between individual and 
'Dep't of Homeland Security, et al. v. New York, et al., 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020). 
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collective rights," 2 that can either allow the best aspects of American 
democracy to shine through, or enable its worst acts of callous indifference. 
In shoring up our nation's democratic institutions and foundations, we are 
called upon to use every ethical tool available to protect against, or to 
correct, flaws that come to light during a critical evaluation of America's 
social fabric. One of those tools is the ability of federal district judges to 
impose nationwide judicial injunctions against controversial government 
policies, stopping them in their tracks and preventing undue harm to 
potential victims while the technicalities of the policy are litigated in court. 
This Article argues that within immigration law, the power to 
impose nationwide judicial injunctions is an indispensable tool for the 
courts to help maintain democratic ideals. This is true for three major 
reasons: 
- Allowing federal district judges to impose 
nationwide injunctions in immigration cases 
honors our commitment to ensuring that 
everyone, including noncitizens, has a legal 
remedy for harms done to them even if they 
cannot afford an attorney; 
- Nationwide injunctions encourage compromise 
in creating policy and disincentivize unilateral 
and extremist policymaking by the executive 
branch, thus providing a stabilizing force in our -
democracy; and 
- Nationwide injunctions are newsworthy, thus 
generating the attention necessary for public 
debate before the enactment of cruel, unpopular 
policies. Therefore, they act as a last-ditch moral 
safety valve to save America from being its worst 
self. 
In Part I, we discuss the background facts of DHS v. New York, 
highlighting Justice Gorsuch's concurrence in the Supreme Court's stay of 
the district court's injunction. Part II discusses nationwide injunctions, their 
recent uses in immigration cases, and arguments for and against this power. 
Part III shows that immigration jurisprudence is a flaw in the foundation of 
American democracy. This section outlines how our immigration law came 
2 Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff and Defendant Oriented 
Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, andOther Constitutional Cases, 39 HARv. J. 
L. & PUB. POL'Y 487, 493 (2016). 
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about and still exhibits traces of structurally antidemocratic principles, like 
racism, and a lack of accountability that has enabled recurring abuses. The 
use of the term "antidemocratic," rather than "undemocratic," is deliberate. 
As the reader will see, the practices at stake are not merely distasteful to a 
democratic polity, they actively erode the norms and expectations on which 
democratic societies rest. In Part IV, we make the case for keeping the 
nationwide injunction power in immigration cases by expanding upon the 
points listed above. 
I. The Case 
DepartmentofHomeland Security v. New York is, on its surface, a 
case about the "public charge rule." 3 The rule is an artifact of federal 
immigration law that has been in force in various forms since the 1880s; 
essentially, it allows the federal government to exclude a noncitizen from 
the country if, in the opinion of the government, the noncitizen is "likely at 
any time to become a public charge." 4 This ground for exclusion is non-
waivable; if a noncitizen is too poor, they cannot gain entry to the United 
States. 
In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) created a new set of requirements that led to 
confusion about how the public charge rule would be defined and applied.' 
The original policy guidance, created under the Clinton Administration in 
1999, interpreted "public charge" to mean a noncitizen who was at a 
minimum "primarily dependent on the government for subsistence," based 
mostly upon their receipt of a limited set of cash benefits. 6 Non-cash 
programs like healthcare benefits or food programs were exempted from the 
evaluation. 7 
In 2018, the Trump administration opted to expand the definition 
and reach of the public charge rule.8 Under this new interpretation, the 
3 See generally U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., Public Charge Provisions of 
Immigration Law: A Brief Historical Background, https://www.uscis.gov/history-and-
genealogy/our-history/public-charge-provisions-immigration-law-a-brief-historical-





8 U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., ProposedRules: Inadmissibility on Public Charge 
Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51114, 51277 (Oct. 10, 2018), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-10-10/pdf/2018-21106.pdf. 
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criteria expanded to include several previously exempt categories, and 
further, a noncitizen's receipt of any benefits for more than 12 months in a 
36-month period. 9 The practical effects of this expansion made it easier for 
the federal government to curtail legal immigration, particularly among 
noncitizens without substantial financial resources. The expansion had a 
noticeable chilling effect; a significant percentage of noncitizens already in 
the United States disenrolled from public benefits for fear of its 
consequences. 0 
Several entities sued the Trump administration over the expansion, 
including the state of New York." On October 11, 2019, the district court 
for the Southern District of New York issued an order enjoining the 
Department of Homeland Security from implementing their changes to the 
public charge rule, pending the consideration and disposition of the 
government's appeals on the merits in the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals.' 2 Practically speaking, the injunction shielded noncitizens from 
the consequences of the policy change until it made its way through the 
courts. In 2019, the Trump administration filed an emergency appeal for a 
stay of the injunction with the U.S. Supreme Court, and in January 2020, a 
5-4 majority of the Court granted that request, enabling the policy to 
continue even as it was being litigated. 13 
9 Id. 
10 See Nicole Narea, Trump'sRule Creating a Wealth Testfor Immigrants is Now in Effect, 
Vox, (Feb. 24, 2020, 4:44 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2019/10/11 /20899253/trump-public-charge-rule-immigrants-welfare-benefits; 
Hamutal Bernstein et al., With Public Charge Rule Looming, One in Seven Adults in 
Immigrant Families Reported Avoiding Public Benefit Programs in 2018, URBAN INST., 
May 21, 2019, https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/public-charge-rule-looming-one-seven-
adults-immigrant-families-reported-avoiding-public-benefit-programs-2018; Samantha 
Artiga et al., Estimated Impacts ofFinalPublic Charge Inadmissibility Rule on Immigrants 
andMedicaid Coverage, KAISER FAM. FOUND., Sept. 18, 2019, https://www.kff.org/report-
section/estimated-impacts-of-final-public-charge-inadmissibility-rule-on-immigrants-
and-medicaid-coverage-key-findings/; Leila Miller, Trump Administration's 'Public 
Charge'Rule Has Chilling Effect on Benefits for Immigrants' Children, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 
3, 2019, https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-09-02/trump-children-benefits-
public-charge-rule. 
" New York v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 
2019). 
12Id. 
13 Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020). 
105 Summer 2021 The Least of These: The Casefor Nationwide Injunctions 
Justice Gorsuch'sConcurrence 
While the public charge rule itself presents an interesting legal topic, 
the part of the case that implicates democratic institutions appeared in 
Justice Gorsuch's concurrence - the role of nationwide injunctions at the 
district court level. Justice Gorsuch emphatically disapproved of them, and 
urged the court to take up the question of whether district judges should 
even have such a power. 4 Two of his statements in particular stand out. 
First, he wrote that '[t]he real problem...is the increasingly common 
practice of trial courts ordering relief that transcends the cases before 
them."15 Secondly, he stated that nationwide injunctions go beyond the 
scope of the courts' powers: 
When a district court orders the government not to enforce a 
rule against the plaintiffs in the case before it, the court 
redresses the injury that gives rise to its jurisdiction in the 
first place. But when a court goes further than that, ordering 
the government to take (or not take) some action with respect 
to those who are strangers to the suit, it is hard to see how 
the court could still be acting in the judicial role of resolving 
cases and controversies. Injunctions like these raise serious 
questions about the scope of courts' equitable powers under 
Article III.16 
These statements make valid formalist arguments, but that same 
formalism erases the real-world suffering that noncitizens would endure 
under a policy change that upended nearly two decades of established law. 
By formalist arguments, we mean arguments based in rigid generalizations, 
high-sounding platitudes, and hidebound doctrinal boxes" that fail to 
grapple with the real-world impact of the position change in question. 
Here, Justice Gorsuch laments that nationwide injunctions are 
becoming commonly used tools, even as the Supreme Court, with his assent, 
granted emergency stays to the Trump administration at uncomfortably 
common rates, as his colleague Justice Sotomayor has noted more than 
14 Id. at 600 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
15 Id. 
17 Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, FourIroniesof Campus Climate, 101 MINN. L. REV. 
1919, 1926 (2017); see also STEVEN W. BENDER, MEA CULPA: LESSONS ON LAW AND 
REGRET FROM U.S. HISTORY (2015) (discussing how disembodied legal reasoning has led 
to egregious mistakes at several points in history). 
16 
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once. 18 Nowhere in his analysis does Justice Gorsuch consider that the very 
policies passed under the Administration might be necessitating this 
increase in nationwide injunctions.19 Moreover, he offers a doctrinal 
concern about nationwide injunctions affecting strangers outside of a given 
suit, while neglecting to reckon with the reality that government action, by 
its very nature, almost inevitably affects people who are not party to a 
particular lawsuit. In immigration, the inadequacy of formalism became 
increasingly apparent under a presidential administration that began with,20 
18 Wolf v. Cook Cty., 140 S. Ct. 681, 683-84 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he 
Government has come to treat th[e] exceptional mechanism of stay relief as a new normal. 
Claiming one emergency after another, the Government has recently sought stays in an 
unprecedented number of cases, demanding immediate attention and consuming limited 
Court resources in each. And with each successive application, of course, its cries of 
urgency ring increasingly hollow... Perhaps most troublingly, the Court's recent behavior 
on stay applications has benefited one litigant over all others.") (internal citation omitted)). 
19 Tessa Berenson, Inside the Trump Administration's Fight Against Nationwide 
Injunctions,TIME, Nov. 4, 2019, https://time.com/5717541/nationwide-injunctions-trump-
administration/ (noting that in less than four years, the Trump administration's policies 
have been blocked by 42 nationwide injunctions, while the Obama administration only 
received 20 over the course of eight years, and Presidents Reagan, Clinton, and George W. 
Bush received an average of 1.5 per year during each of their tenures). 
20 Adam Gabbat, Golden escalator ride: the surreal day Trump kicked off his bid for 
president, GUARDIAN, June 14, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2019/jun/13/donald-trump-presidential-campaign-speech-eyewitness-memories 
(quoting a campaign speech wherein Trump said, in reference to immigrants from Mexico: 
"... they're bringing drugs, they're bringing crime, they're rapists."). 
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and continued to use, racist anti-immigrant rhetoric to craft policy and score 
political points2' - often with disastrous results. 2 2 
Alexis de Tocqueville noted America's "singular attachment to the 
formalities of law' 2 3 during the genocide ofNative Americans in the 1830s, 
mockingly stating that it would be "impossible to destroy men with more 
21 See, e.g., Julissa Arce, Trump's Anti-ImmigrantRhetoric Was Never About Legality -
It Was About Our Brown Skin, TIME, Aug. 6, 2019, https://time.com/5645501/trump-anti-
immigration-rhetoric-racism!; Philip Rucker, 'How do you stop these people?': Trump's 
anti-immigrantrhetoric looms over El Paso massacre, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2019, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-do-you-stop-these-people-trumps-anti-
immigrant-rhetoric-looms-over-el-paso-massacre/2 0 19/08/04/62d0435a-b6ce-11 e9-a091-
6a96e67d9cce_story.html; John Fritze, Trump used words like 'invasion' and 'killer' to 
discuss immigrantsat rallies500 times: USA TODAYanalysis, USA TODAY, Aug. 8, 2019, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2019/08/08/trump-immigrants-
rhetoric-criticized-el-paso-dayton-shootings/1936742001/; Reuters, Survey: Trump 's 
immigrationrhetoric is negatively impactingLatinos' health, NBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2019, 
7:47 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/survey-trump-s-immigration-rhetoric-
negatively-impacting-latinos-health-n1076011; Jonathan Blitzer, How Stephen Miller 
ManipulatesDonald Trump to FurtherHis Immigration Obsession, NEW YORKER, Feb. 
21, 2020, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/03/02/how-stephen-miller-
manipulates-donald-trump-to-further-his-immigration-obsession (explaining Stephen 
Miller's role in both supporting and creating Trump's immigration policies); Amanda 
Holpuch, Stephen Miller: the white nationalistat the heart of Trump's White House, 
GUARDIAN, Nov. 24, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/nov/24/stephen-
miller-white-nationalist-trump-immigration-guru; Kim Bellware, Leaked Stephen Miller 
emails show Trump's point man on immigration promoted white nationalism, SPLC 
reports, WASH. POST, Nov. . 13, 2019, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/11 / 2/leaked-stephen-miller-emails-
suggest-trumps-point-man-immigration-promoted-white-nationalism/. 
22 See, e.g., Matt Stieb, Everything We Know About the Inhumane Conditionsat Migrant 
Detention Camps, N.Y. MAG, Jul. 2, 2019, https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/07/the-
inhumane-conditions-at-migrant-detention-camps.html; Simon Romero et al., Hungry, 
Scaredand Sick: Inside the MigrantDetention Center in Clint, Tex., N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 9, 
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/07/06/us/migrants-border-patrol-
clint.html; Tal Kopan, Trump administrationadmits it lost track ofnearly 1,500 immigrant 
children, CNN (Sept. 19, 2018, 4:31 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/20 18/09/19/politics/undocumented-immigrant-children-not-
located-detention-released; Robert Moore, Susan Schmidt & Maryam Jameel, Inside the 
Cell Where a Sick 16 Year Old Boy Died in Border PatrolCare, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 5, 
2019, 1:30 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-the-cell-where-a-sick-16-year-
old-boy-died-in-border-patrol-care. 
23 Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of 
EuropeanRacism and Colonialismin the NarrativeTraditionsofFederalIndian Law, 31 
ARiz. L. REv. 237, 240 (1989). 
108 UCDavis SocialJusticeLaw Review Vol. 25:2 
respect for the laws of humanity."2 4 Nearly 200 years later, it is 
disappointing to see that same attachment o formalism paving the way for 
more mistreatment of a marginalized group. This is not to equate genocide 
with a change in legal interpretation, far from it, we merely wish to point 
out that the same thinking so long as we follow the correct set of rules 
and technicalities, then cruelty is justifiable - is just as profoundly 
misguided and unconscionable now as it was then. It is also dangerous to 
our democracy. When we allow these behaviors to proceed unchecked, we 
risk normalizing them and exposing our society at large to their 
consequences. Fortunately, we have a tool at our disposal that stops this 
behavior before normalization and allows our society to ask, "is this the 
country that we want to be?" 
II. Nationwide Injunctions 
"Nationwide injunction" refers to a very specific kind of relief that can be 
granted in federal district court. When a plaintiff successfully challenges a 
law or regulation as violative of a state or the federal constitution, the court 
must decide two things: first, whether an injunction is the correct remedy, 
and second, what the appropriate breadth of the injunction would be.2 5 On 
one hand, the court can decide whether the injunction should only grant 
relief to the plaintiffs, thus precluding the government defendants from 
enforcing the successfully challenged statute against the plaintiffs in the 
case, but leaving the government free to enforce the law against other 
members of the public. 26 On the other hand, the court can instead choose to 
enjoin the government from enforcing the policy against anyone in the state 
or the nation.27 When discussing nationwide injunctions, we refer to the 
second, defendant-focused option. 
A. Recent Uses of Universal Injunctions in Immigration Cases 
Nationwide immigration injunctions have seen increased use in the 
past several years, and have had consequences on both sides of the political 
spectrum. For example, in 2014, twenty-six states filed suit in federal court 
against the Obama administration, challenging a policy known as Deferred 
Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA).28 The policy granted the 
241d. 
25 Morely, supranote 2, at 489. 
26 1d. at 489-90. 
27 Id. at 490. 
28 Texas v. United States, 86 F.Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 
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undocumented parents of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents 
(LPRs) temporary relief from removal, as well as work authorization. 29 The 
states sought a nationwide preliminary injunction, arguing that DAPA 
violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, and the President's constitutional obligation to faithfully execute 
American laws.30 The district court found that the plaintiffs were likely to 
prevail on the merits and would suffer irreparable harm if the policy were 
allowed to proceed, and issued a nationwide injunction in response. 31 The 
Fifth Circuit, 3 2 as well as the Supreme Court in a split 4-4 per curiam 
opinion, affirmed without setting precedent. 33 
Perhaps because of the Trump administration's aggressive anti-
immigrant policies, 34 lower courts have handed down several other 
3 5 nationwide injunctions in immigration cases. Perhaps the most high-
profile example of these policies is the Trump administration travel ban 
created by Executive order 13769,36 also known as the "Muslim Ban." 37 
29 Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The PresidentandImmigrationLaw Redux, 125 
YALE L.J. 104, 140 (2015). 
30 Complaint at 28, Texas v. United States, No. 14-00254 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 
31 Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 671-72, 674, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 
32 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). 
33 Texas v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam). 
34 Christine Chan et al., The Trump Effect, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/trump-
effect/immigration (last visited Mar. 27, 2021). 
3 See, e.g., NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209,218-19 (D.D.C. 2018) (discussing the 
recession of DACA); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2.017); 
City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 291 (7th Cir. 2018); City of Providence v. Barr, 
No. 19-1802 (1st Cir. 2020); City of Los Angeles v. Barr, No. 18-55599 (9th Cir. 2019); 
City of Philadelphia v. Attorney General, No. 18-2648 (3d Cir. 2019); New York et al. v. 
United States Dep't ofJustice et al., Nos. 19-267(L); 19-275(con) (2d Cir. 2020). 
36 Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 
2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-01/pdf/2017-02281.pdf. 
3' See Avidan Cover, Quieting the Court: Lessons from The Muslim-Ban Case, 23 J. 
GENDER, RACE & JUS. (2019); Vahid Niayesh, Trump's travel ban really was a Muslim 
ban, data suggests, WASH. PosT, Sept. 26, 2019, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/09/26/trumps-muslim-ban-really-was-
muslim-ban-thats-what-data-suggest/; Ryan Teague Beckwith, President Trump's Own 
Words Keep Hurting His Travel Ban, TIME, Mar. 16, 2017, 
https://time.com/4703614/travel-ban-judges-donald-trump-words/; Michelle Mark, 
Trump's campaignstatementsaboutMuslims came underfire duringthe Supreme Court's 
travel ban arguments, Bus. INSIDER, Apr. 25, 2018, 
https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-muslim-ban-questioned-in-supreme-court-
arguments-2018-4; David Bier, A Dozen Times Trump Equated his Travel Ban with a 
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This order banned noncitizens from seven predominantly Muslim countries 
from entering the United States. It was immediately challenged in court, and 
was nationally enjoined by a federal district court in Washington state; the 
injunction was then upheld by the Ninth Circuit.38 The administration 
revoked the order and issued a second one, this time temporarily banning 
all refugees from entry, as well as nationals from six predominantly Muslim 
countries. 39 Again, the policy was challenged in court, and again was 
nationally enjoined, preventing it from taking effect.40 This time, the 
administration petitioned the Supreme Court for a stay of.the injunction, 
and the Court responded by slightly narrowing the injunction.4 1 Eventually, 
the second case was dismissed for mootness.42 In September 2017, the 
Trump administration issued a third order, placing entry restrictions on 
noncitizens from eight foreign nations that it determined had not adequately 
shared or managed information about threats coming from their nationals. 43 
Ultimately, after further litigation, this third round of revisions resulted in 
the Supreme Court upholding the policy in Trump v. Hawaii.44Though the 
religious animus behind the ban was well documented, the majority 
dismissed this concern 45 using national security justifications in 
combination with the plenary power doctrine, discussed below. 46 Instead, 
the majority discussed whether the ban fell within the President's broad 
legal authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), ultimately 
holding that it did. 47 
Muslim Ban, CATO INST. (Aug. 14, 2017, 12:06 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/dozen-
times-trump-equated-travel-ban-muslim-ban. 
38 Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1511, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017). 
39 Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, 13211-12, 1325 (Mar. 6, 2017). 
Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087-88 (2017). 
4' Id. at 2089. 
4 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017). 
43 Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the 
United States by Terrorists or Other Public Safety Threats, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 45164 
(Sept. 24, 2017). 
' Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). 
4s Trump v. Hawaii, 132 HARV. L. REv. 327, 330-31 (2018). 
' See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text. 
47 HARV. L. REV., supranote 45. 
4 
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B. The Debate SurroundingNationwide Injunctions 
Scholars have raised several arguments against nationwide 
injunctions in a variety of forums.48 Generally, the arguments against them 
are rooted in a process-oriented framework; a leading critic of these 
injunctions, Michael Morely, refers to them as "de facto class action[s]. 49" 
Morely argues that Defendant-Oriented injunctions run contrary to the 
policy rationale underlying FederalRule of Civil Procedure23, the law of 
judgments, and the courts' limited jurisdiction: 
First, the plaintiffs usually lack standing to protect the rights 
of third parties, and particularly the rights of the public as a 
whole. Second, relatedly, Defendant-Oriented Injunctions 
may violate the due process rights of non-parties to the 
litigation. By seeking a Defendant-Oriented Injunction, 
individual plaintiffs leverage the rights of third parties who 
may not even be subject to the court's personal jurisdiction, 
without their consent, in order to obtain more sweeping 
relief. Third, Defendant-Oriented Injunctions have unfairly 
asymmetric preclusive effects. A successful plaintiff can 
bind the government defendants regarding people who are 
not before the court. If the defendants prevail, in contrast, 
that judgment generally does not preclude subsequent 
actions, either in the same court or other jurisdictions, by 
third parties. Fourth, Defendant-Oriented Injunctions run 
contrary to the general rules governing judgments, and 
effectively provide class-wide relief despite the plaintiffs' 
failure to satisfy FederalRule of CivilProcedure23. Thus, 
the policy considerations that underlie both the law of 
judgments and Rule 23 weigh strongly against Defendant-
Oriented Injunctions in non-class cases. Finally, by issuing 
a Defendant-Oriented Injunction, a court applies its 
interpretation of the law to right-holders and claims outside 
the scope of its limited territorial jurisdiction, where its 
opinions lack precedential effect. 5o 
48 See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors:Reforming the NationalInjunction, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 418 (2017); Michael T. Morely, DisaggregatingNationwide Injunctions, 
71 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2019). 
49 Morely, supranote 2, at 522. 
50 Id. at 522-23. 
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Additionally, one might argue that the power to issue nationwide 
injunctions encourages lawyers to forum shop, 5 1 makes the courts 
dangerously political,5 2 creates a risk of conflicting injunctions,5 3 and 
potentially grants federal district court judges excessive power.5 4 
Even so, a few scholars defend federal district judges' power to issue 
nationwide injunctions.55 At least one Circuit Court has acknowledged their 
utility, 56 but scholars offer qualified, rather than broad defenses. They 
argue, as does this Article, that nationwide injunctions should be applied 
only in specific circumstances or classes of cases, such as bad faith action 
by the government. 57 Defenders of nationwide injunctions also argue that 
these orders are people-, rather than process-oriented, remedying negative 
consequences affecting the victims of poor or extremist policies. Defenders 
acknowledge some of the flaws with nationwide injunctions,5 ' but argue 
that these are small compared to the benefits. For example, these injunctions 
are sometimes necessary to provide complete relief to plaintiffs, 59 and to 
prevent irreparable harm to nonparties that lack easy access to the courts. 60 
Further, Amanda Frost, the earliest defender of nationwide injunctions, 
argues that "[c]hallenges to policies that cross state lines such as regulations 
concerning clean air and water, and some immigration policies [...] require 
broad injunctions." 61 Additionally, she notes that class certification can be 
difficult or impossible to obtain for certain plaintiffs, and in any case, the 
government has several strategies available to prevent plaintiffs from 
achieving certification. 62 Frost also addresses Justice Gorsuch's concerns 
about Article III,63 by noting that though "[t]he text of Article III does not 
51 Bray, supranote 48, at 460. 
52 Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1065, 1106 
(2018). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 1067. 
5 See, e.g., Frost, supranote 52; Alan M. Trammell, Demystifying NationwideInjunctions, 
98 TEX. L. REv. 67, 106-07 (2019). 
56 See City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 288 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting that although 
nationwide injunctions should be rare, they "can be beneficial in terms of efficiency and 
certainty in the law, and more importantly, in the avoidance of irreparable harm and in 
furtherance of the public interest."). 
7 E.g., Tramell, supranote 55, at 104. 
58 E.g., Frost, supra note 52, at 1104-15. 
59 Id. at 1090-91. 
60 Id. at 1094-95. 
61 Id. at 1091. 
62 Id. at 1089. 
63 Id. at 1080-90; see also supranote 16 and accompanying text. 
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spell out the scope of the judiciary's equitable powers, [...] tradition and 
precedent suggest that broad remedial injunctions are constitutionally 
permissible, and in some cases essential, as a means of enabling the courts 
to check the political branches."" 
In addition to the powerful arguments from defenders of nationwide 
injunctions, readers should consider a practical analysis that demonstrates 
that in immigration cases, the asymmetric claim preclusion argument in 
particular is an argument based in abstraction, rather than the realities of 
litigation. To reach this conclusion, one needs only look at the massive 
power disparities between the litigants seeking immigration-focused 
nationwide injunctions noncitizens - and the American federal 
government. The government can indefinitely detain certain classes of 
noncitizens,65 and often does so in a way that prevents them from 
coordinating with an attorney, 66 compounding the difficulties that 
noncitizens generally face in accessing the American legal system.6 7 
Moreover, in immigration proceedings noncitizens do not enjoy a 
constitutional right to counsel, they merely have a statutory right to hire 
their own attorney. 68 To recognize just how asymmetric immigration cases 
are, imagine two boxers rather than two legal parties - the government, a 
professional heavyweight, and noncitizens, amateur flyweights. To begin, 
the heavyweight has hired the referee and set the rules of the match. Next, 
64Id. at 1080.
65See infra notes 116-122, 124-133 and accompanying text. 
66 Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hemindez, Due Process and Immigrant Detainee Prison 
Transfers:Moving LPRs to IsolatedPrisons Violates TheirRight to Counsel, 21 BERKELEY 
LA RAZA L.J. 17 (2011) (finding that immigration detainees have a more difficult time 
accessing legal aid and representation when they are continually transferred to different 
detention centers); see also Yuki Noguchi, UnequalOutcomes: Most ICE DetaineesHeld 
in RuralAreas Where DeportationRisks Soar, NPR (Aug. 15, 2019, 7:13 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/15/748764322/unequal-outcomes-most-ice-detainees-held-
in-rural-areas-where-deportation-risks; see also Kyle Kim, Immigrants Held in ICE 
FacilitiesStruggle to FindLegal Aid Before Being Deported, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 28, 2017, 
https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-access-to-counsel-deportation/. 
67 See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in 
ImmigrationCourt, 164 U. PENN. L. REv. 1 (2015) (finding that only 37% of all immigrants 
and only 14% of detained immigrants secured legal representation from the years 2007 to 
2012); see also Samantha Balaban et al., WithoutA Lawyer, Asylum Seekers Struggle With 
ConfusingLegalProcesses, NPR (Feb. 25, 2018, 2:10 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/02/25/588646667/without-a-lawyer-asylum-seekers-struggle-
with-confusing-legal-processes. 
68 Note: The Right to Be Heardfrom ImmigrationPrisons:Locating a Right ofAccess to 
Counselfor ImmigrationDetainees in the Right of Access to Courts, 132 HARv. L. REv. 
726 (2018).. 
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the flyweight, who has not been informed of the rules, is blindfolded and 
hobbled with a hand tied behind their back. Moreover, the flyweight does 
not have a coach or other helper in their corner. Under these circumstances, 
Morely's asymmetric claim preclusion critique would argue that, should the 
flyweight win under these circumstances, somehow the resulting prize is 
unfair. The government is not a small company or other private party; it is 
far from helpless. Though the government's resources are not infinite, they 
are large enough to minimize concerns about he expense and fairness of 
protracted litigation. Furthermore, if one immigration policy is struck down 
or stalled, as the Trump administration has shown in cases like the Muslim 
Ban, the government simply makes another. 69 Noncitizen plaintiffs do not 
have that luxury. 
As mentioned, immigration, like environmental policy and voting, 
implicates a "deep interplay between individual and collective rights," 70 one 
that often cannot be adequately addressed by individual plaintiffs seeking 
relief from the law solely for themselves. However, in two respects, 
immigration law differs from other areas. First, it was born in, and remains 
mired in racism. Second, its current jurisprudence undermines or flouts 
every democratic principle that we claim to hold dear. 
Consider these points, in turn: 
III. Tips for Implementing Trauma-Informed Practice in the Law 
School Classroom. 
"Injusticeanywhere is a threattojustice everywhere. We arecaught in an 
inescapablenetwork of mutuality, tied in a singlegarment ofdestiny. 
Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly." 
- Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
To understand how nationwide injunctions can help the courts 
strengthen the foundations of American democracy against our immigration 
jurisprudence, it is important to recognize just how antidemocratic that 
jurisprudence is. Immigration law and policy have enabled America's worst 
impulses in the past and continue to do so. Anyone with dreams of enabling 
an invasive surveillance state that makes a mockery of the Fourth 
69 See supranotes 36-47 and accompanying text. 
70 Morely, supranote 2, at 493-94. 
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Amendment can do so under the banner of immigration.7 1 Anyone who 
wants to act out their worst urges against an outsider can do so to 
noncitizens, even killing, with impunity. 72 A plethora of atrocities come 
readily to mind, with the permissive and racialized nature of immigration 
jurisprudence serving as the thread running through many of them. From its 
very inception, American immigration jurisprudence has been infected by 
racism and inhumane treatment of excluded groups. It is one of the most 
antidemocratic and shameful elements in the American legal system. To 
correct it, the system needs legal tools that serve as democratic guardrails, 
ones that loudly call attention to the injustices taking place in this area of 
the law. Nationwide injunctions are effective for accomplishing both 
objectives. 
71See Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance,74 MD. L. REV. 1 (2014); Anil Kalhan, The 
Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of InteriorImmigration Enforcement, 41 
U.C. DAVIs L. REV. (2008). 
7 2 See Cleve R. Wootson Jr., Borderagents beatan undocumentedimmigrantto death. The 
U.S. is paying his family $1 million., WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/03/28/border-agents-beat-
an-undocumented-immigrant-to-death-the-u-s-is-paying-his-family-i-million/ (stating 
that though the victim's family is being paid in a settlement, none of the agents involved 
faced discipline or lost pay, even though they beat an unarmed man so badly that they broke 
his ribs, damaged his spine, and killed him, then tried to seize video evidence from nearby 
civilians); Vanessa Romo, Supreme Court Rules Border Agents Who Shoot Foreign 
Nationals Can't Be Sued, NPR (Feb. 25, 2020, 6:21 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/02/25/8094013 34/supreme-court-rules-border-patrol-agents-
who-shoot-foreign-nationals-cant-be-sue. 
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A. America's Last Bastion ofLegally Sanctioned Racism 
"In thefirstplace, we should insistthat if the immigrantwho comes here 
in goodfaith becomes an American and assimilateshimselfto us, he shall 
be treatedon an exact equality with everyone else, for it is an outrageto 
discriminateagainstany such man because of creed, or birthplace,or 
origin." 
- Theodore Roosevelt, 1907 
"In the opinion ofthe Government of the UnitedStates the coming of 
Chinese laborersto this country endangersthe good orderof certain 
localities... Hereafterno State court or court of the UnitedStates shall 
admit Chineseto citizenship." 
- The Chinese Exclusion Act, made permanent by President Theodore 
Roosevelt in 1904 
Immigration law and policy in America are, at their core, about the 
intersection ofracism and government power. The proof lies exposed in our 
history of hostility directed toward nearly every immigrant group that has 
landed on American shores.7 3 Naturally, that attitude has extended to how 
the court treats noncitizens. American immigration jurisprudence was born 
in the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Melville Fuller. 74 This Court, 
which institutionalized racial segregation and hierarchy in Plessy v. 
Ferguson,75 also authored Chae ChanPingv. UnitedStates,76 better known 
as The Chinese Exclusion Case, and Fong Yue Ting v. UnitedStates,7 7 two 
cornerstones of immigration law. Both cases concerned Chinese laborers 
who had resided and worked in America and were facing exclusion or 
73 See, e.g., MATTHEw FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN 
IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE (1999); George J. Sanchez, Facethe Nation: 
Race, Immigration, andthe Rise ofNativism in Late Twentieth Century America, 31 INT'L 
MIGRATION REV. 1009 (1997 (same)); Ediberto Roman, The Alien Invasion?, 45 HouS. L. 
REV. 841 (2008); Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy 
Scholarship,Law in the Ivory Tower, andthe LegalIndifference ofthe Race Critique,2000 
U. ILL. L. REV. 525 (2000). 
Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation'sLast Stronghold, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (1998). 
75 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
76 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
77 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
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expulsion under the Chinese Exclusion Act. 78 Passed in 1882, and 
extending for more than sixty years, the Act was the first piece of legislation 
in American history to ban noncitizens from entry based on race. 79 In Chae 
Chan Ping, the Court held that even though the Act violated two 
international treaties, Congress enjoyed an unenumerated power to regulate 
immigration, which could be exercised to exclude aliens of a particular 
race. 80 In Fong Yue Ting, the Court held that if Congress branded a race as 
undesirable, then lawful residents of that race, even those who had been 
living in America for years, could be deported.81 In the same case, the Court 
also upheld a rule that explicitly required lawful Chinese residents to have 
a white witness to vouch for their presence in America. 82 In both cases, the 
Court wrote that it seemed "impossible" for people of Chinese origin to 
assimilate into American culture, because of their supposed inborn 
defects.83 Neither case has been overturned. 
The jurisprudential theory underlying the decisions in these two 
cases have come to be known as the "plenary power doctrine," which 
provides that the power of Congress over the admission of aliens to this 
country is nearly absolute and not subject to judicial review. 84 In many 
cases, this doctrine makes racial discrimination in the immigration setting 
legal. 85 Stare decisis has kept the plenary power doctrine alive, despite its 
origin in the most blatant and outright racism. The Court itself has 
acknowledged that the doctrine is at odds with other constitutional 
jurisprudence, but essentially shrugs, on the ground that it is too firmly 
entrenched to be uprooted. 86 
78 Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, repealedby Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 
Stat. 600. 
79 Kat Chow, As Chinese Exclusion Act Turns 135, Experts Pointto ParallelsToday, NPR 
(May 5, 2017, 6:06 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/05/05/527091890/the-135-year-bridge-
between-the-chinese-exclusion-act-and-a-proposed-travel-ban; Ire e Hsu, The Echoes of 
Chinese Exclusion, NEW REPUBLIC (Jun. 28, 2018), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/ 149437/echoes-chinese-exclusion. 
80 Chin, supranote 74, at 11. 
81 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707. 
82Id. at 730. 
83 Id. at 717; Chae ChanPing, 130 U.S. at 595. 
84 Natsu T. Saito, The PlenaryPowerDoctrine: SubvertingHuman Rights in the Name of 
Sovereignty, 51 CATH. U. L. REv. 1115, 1119 (2002) (discussing the history of the doctrine 
and its place in American law). 
85 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 731. 
86 Chin, supra note 74, at 15-16 (citing Justice Frankfurter in Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 
522, 530-31 (1954) who wrote "In light of the expansion of the concept of substantive due 
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A judicial norm, immigration exceptionalism, undergirds and works 
in tandem with the plenary power doctrine. 87 Under immigration 
exceptionalism, the courts acknowledge that in immigration law, "Congress 
regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to Citizens,"88 
but justify this practice because: 1) it concerns noncitizens; not citizens, 89 
and 2) because immigration cases supposedly present "policy questions 
entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our Government, and 
[courts] have no judicial authority to substitute [their] political judgment for 
that of the Congress." 90 As a result, "[p]robably no other area of American 
law has been so radically insulated and divergent from those fundamental 
norms of constitutional right, administrative procedure, and judicial role 
that animate the rest of our legal system."91 
Below, we consider the legal landscape created by these 
complementary principles. One of the goals of the courts in a democratic 
society is to uphold the rule of law. When examining immigration law we 
must be critical; simply "upholding the rule of law" is not a tenable position 
when the law permits outright inhumanity. For our democracy to remain 
robust and healthy, courts cannot solely be concerned with upholding the 
process as a limitation upon all powers of Congress, even the war power, 
see Hamilton v. Kentucky DistilleriesCo., 251 U.S. 146, 155, much could be said for the 
view, were we writing on a clean slate, that the Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of 
political discretion heretofore recognized as belonging to Congress in regulating the entry 
and deportation of aliens. [...] But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power of 
Congress under review, there is not merely 'a page of history,' New York Trust Co. 
v. Eisner,256 U.S. 345, 349, but a whole volume. Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens 
and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of 
government. In the enforcement of these policies, the Executive Branch of the Government 
must respect the procedural safeguards of due process. The JapaneseImmigrantCase, 189 
U.S. 86, 101; Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49. But that the formulation of 
these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly imbedded 
in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government."). 
87 See generally David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration 
Exceptionalism, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 583 (2017) (discussing how the two doctrines work 
together to produce an area of almost unbridled discretion); Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a 
Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Predictionfor Our Strange But 
UnexceptionalConstitutionalImmigrationLaw, 14 Geo. Immigr. L. J. 257 (2000) (same). 
88 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (internal citations omitted). 
89 Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 87, at 584. 
90 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2136 (2015) (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798 
(1977) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
91 Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 87, at 593 (quoting Hiroshi Motomura, 
ImmigrationLaw After a Century ofPlenaryPower:Phantom Constitutional Norms and 
StatutoryInterpretation,100 YALE L.J. 545, 564-65 (1990)). 
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letter of the law; they must uphold a firm commitment to due process and 
equal treatment. If a law or policy falls short in these respects, it is 
incumbent upon the courts to act as a bulwark for those harmed by it using 
any tools at their disposal, including nationwide injunctions. 
B. Immigration Jurisprudence Enables Cruelty andEgregious 
Legal Arguments 
"We have people coming into the country or trying to come in, we're 
stopping a lot ofthem, but we're takingpeople out of the country. You 
wouldn't believe how badthesepeople are. These aren'tpeople, they're 
animals." 
- President Donald Trump 
Under current immigration jurisprudence, America is not only 
permitted to be its worst self, it is blessed by the Court to do so. The hands-
off approach of the plenary power doctrine, combined with the "anything 
goes" reasoning behind immigration exceptionalism, has created legal 
cover to a type of dehumanization known as moral exclusion.9 2 Moral 
exclusion is the process of placing undesirable groups "...outside [of] the 
[social] boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of 
fairness apply." 93 Since morally excluded groups - noncitizens, in this 
case - do not count as "one ofus," anything done to them under our law is 
permissible, no matter how unreasonable or cruel. 94 Consider how 
dehumanization enables well-educated attorneys from the American 
government to put forward some of the most preposterous arguments that 
one could make against a fellow human being, indeed, a child. Consider, 
too, whether those arguments strengthen or undermine a nation that 
professes to be a healthy democracy. 
1. Cruelty Toward Children 
In 2019, a Department of Justice attorney made headlines by arguing 
that noncitizen children detained by the government do not need 
toothbrushes or soap in order for their conditions to be considered safe and 
92 Philip A. Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, HistoricalDehumanization, 
and ContemporaryConsequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 292, 293 (2008) 
(discussing the social science roots of dehumanization). 
93 Susan Opotow, Moral Exclusion andInjustice:An Introduction,46 J. Soc. IssUES 1-20 
(1990) (discussing the roots of dehumanization); see also Bender, supranote 17 (same). 
94 Goff et al., supranote 92, at 293 
120 UCDavisSocialJusticeLaw Review Vol. 25:2 
sanitary. 95 This case made the news at the same time that the media were 
exposing brutal conditions for children detained at the border under the 
Trump administration's mandatory family separation policy.96 Children as 
young as seven years old were left to care for toddlers, who, without diapers, 
were soiling their clothes. 97 Multiple facilities also faced dangerous 
overcrowding, in one instance with nine hundred noncitizens crammed into 
a facility designed for one hundred and twenty-five.98 The litigation filed in 
response to these conditions arose from the Flores Agreement, a 1997 
consent decree regulating the conditions for federal government detention 
of minor noncitizens. 99 Though a Trump administration lawyer made the 
argument against providing toothbrushes and soap, the conditions at issue 
are rooted an Obama administration decision to expand the federal 
government's capacity to detain noncitizen families. 100 In 2015, federal 
district judge Dolly M. Gee found that the Obama regime had violated the 
terms of the Flores agreement by refusing to release accompanied minor 
noncitizens from a family detention facility, and detaining the children in 
"widespread and deplorable conditions". 101 Judge Gee issued a remedial 
order to the Department of Homeland Security, which appealed, presaging 
a years long battle in her courtroom to enforce the Floresagreement.10 2 Part 
of this ongoing battle culminated a 2017 ruling which found that the 
government - this time under the Trump administration - had again failed 
" Ken White, Why a Government Lawyer Argued against Giving Immigrant Kids 
Toothbrushes, ATLANTIC, June 23, 2019, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/why-sarah-fabian-argued-against-
giving-kids-toothbrushes/592366/. 
96 Caitlin Dickerson, 'There is a Stench': Soiled Clothes and No Baths for Migrant 
Children at a Texas Center, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/us/migrant-children-border-soap.html; see also 
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Lessons from Mexican Folklore: An Essay on U.S. 
ImmigrationPolicy, ChildSeparation,andLa Llorona, 81 U. PITT. L. REv. 287 (2019). 
97 Dickerson, supranote 96. 
98 Id. 
99 Stipulated Settlement Agreement at 3, 7-18, 20, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544-
RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1997), 
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/flores_v_meeseagreement.pdf. 
I0 Dora Schriro, Weeping in the Playtime of Others: The ObamaAdministration'sFailed 
Reform ofICE Family Detention Practices,5 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 452, 458-
65 (2017). 
10' Flores v. Johnson, 212 F.Supp. 3d 864, 881 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
102 See generally Flores v. Lynch, 212 F. Supp. 3d 907 (C.D. Cal. 2015); Flores v. Lynch, 
828 F. 3d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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to uphold the Floresagreement. 103 Here, the violations consisted of failures 
to provide noncitizen children with adequate food, access to clean drinking 
water, or access to hygiene products like toothbrushes and soap.' 04 
Moreover, the court found that the government was subjecting noncitizen 
children to extremely cold temperatures (lowering the temperatures further 
when the children complained),105 and was depriving them of rest by 
forcing them to sleep under bright lights on concrete floors without 
blankets. 106 The government argued that it did not need to provide children 
with soap, towels, showers, dry clothing, or toothbrushes because the Flores 
Agreement did not explicitly mention those items. 107 In response, the 
district court found that those items were encompassed by the Agreement's 
language requiring that children be kept in "safe and sanitary conditions." 108 
In 2018, rather than correcting the faulty conditions, the Trump 
administration filed an appeal in the Ninth Circuit, which alleged that the 
district judge had altered the Agreement by mandating soap and 
toothbrushes. The appeal was denied.' 09 
Children also suffer in other ways under the current immigration 
regime. Since noncitizens have no constitutional right to counsel in removal 
proceedings, unaccompanied noncitizen children are reduced to 
representing themselves in hearings about whether or not they should be 
deported." 0 Scholars have argued for an extension of those rights to 
noncitizen children,"' but currently courts recognize no such right; in 2018, 
a three judge panel on the Ninth Circuit held that neither the Constitution 
103 Order Re Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce and Appoint a Special Monitor at 1, Flores v. 
Sessions, No. CV 84-4544 DMG (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. Jun. 27,2017) available at 
https://www.aila.org/File/Related/14111359v.pdf. 
104 Id. at 7-15. 
105 Id. at 16. 
106 Id. at 15- 18. 
107 Id. at 13. 
108 Id 
109 Floresv. Barr,934 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2019). 
10 Misrylena Egkolfopoulou, The Thousands of Children Who Go to Immigration Court 
Alone, ATLANTIC, Aug. 21, 2018, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/children-immigration-
court/567490/ (discussing procedural injustice toward immigrant children); Vivian Yee & 
Miriam Jordan, Migrant Childrenin Search ofJustice:A 2-Year-Old's Day in Immigration 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/us/migrant-
children-family-separation-court.html (same). 
" See, e.g., Benjamin Good, Note: A Child's Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 
10 STAN. J. C.R.C.L. 109 (2014) (noting the lack of protections for child claimants). 
122 UCDavis Social Justice Law Review Vol. 25:2 
nor the INA provide noncitizen children with a right to public counsel.11 2 
In a rehearing en banc in 2019, the Ninth Circuit outright refused to answer 
the question. 113 
The challenges facing pro se litigants are well-documented outside 
of the immigration setting, 4 prompting a reasonable observer to ask, what 
healthy democracy would put such a burden on a child that does not speak 
their language? What healthy democracy would expend resources arguing 
that children detained in overcrowded facilities do not need soap or 
toothbrushes, rather than simply providing hygiene items? American 
immigration law is indicative of a fundamentally unhealthy democracy. It 
perpetuates a system that wants the poor, the tired, the huddled masses -
so that it can leave them as wretched (but profitable) refuse on a detention 
center's concrete floors. 1 5 
2. Indefinite Civil Detention 
Physical detention is an inextricable component of American 
immigration enforcement; enforcement agents have raided hospitals and 
courthouses,116 and even constructed a fake university to apprehend 
noncitizens. 117 Once caught, noncitizens have no way of knowing how long 
their confinement will last. In ex rel Mezei, the Supreme Court upheld the 
"2 See generally Andrew Leon Hanna, A ConstitutionalRight to Appointed Counselfor 
the ChildrenofAmerica'sRefugee Crisis,54 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 257 (2019) (detailing 
the deficiencies of a system that does not guarantee the right to counsel). 
13 C.J.L.G. v. Barr, No. 16-73801 at 4 (9th Cir. 2019) ("[I]t need not address [the] 
contention that appointment of counsel for minors in removal proceedings is 
constitutionally required."). 
114 See generallyJona Goldschmidt, The ProSe Litigant'sStrugglefor Access to Justice: 
Meeting the ChallengesofBench andBarResistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36 (2002). 
11s Clyde Haberman, ForPrivatePrisons, Detaining Immigrants is Big Business, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/us/prisons-immigration-
detention.html (discussing the deficiencies of the for-profit system). 
116 Peter Hall, ICE criticizedfor arrestat Scranton hospital, MORNING CALL (Mar. 16, 
2020, 6:13 PM), https://www.mcall.com/news/pennsylvania/mc-nws-pa-ice-immigrant-
arrest-hospital-scranton-coronavirus-20200316-3itga24pdfau3kjnkm62jcdsai-story.html; 
Ryan Devereaux, ICE CourthouseArrests in New York Increased 1,700 Percent Under 
Trump, INTERCEPT (Jan. 28, 2019, 8:32 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/01/28/ice-
courthouse-arrests-in-new-york-increased-1700-percent-under-trump/. 
"?7Sarah Mervosh, ICE Ran a Fake University in Michiganto Catch ImmigrationFraud, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/us/farmington-
university-arrests-ice.html. 
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indefinite detention of a noncitizen on security grounds based on secret 
information without judicial or administrative review. 1 8 Mezei was born in 
Gibraltar and lived in the United States for approximately 25 years, between 
1923 and 1948.119 He left the U.S. to care for his dying mother in Romania, 
but was delayed in Hungary for 19 months due to complications with his 
documentation 120 . When he tried to return to America, he was permanently 
excluded from the country on national security grounds without a hearing 
based on secret, undisclosed evidence. 121 Mezei attempted to leave to other 
countries, but since the United States had declared him a security risk, no 
one else would admit him. 122 Thus, he was effectively stranded on Ellis 
Island; he was physically in U.S. territory, but had not been formally 
admitted to the country. 123 Therefore, Mezei was not in America, legally 
speaking.1 24 In immigration, the courts embrace what is referred to as the 
entry fiction doctrine - unless a noncitizen is formally admitted, they are 
not technically "in the United States." 125 The courts consider this true even 
if the noncitizen is forcibly detained by American law enforcement in a 
detention facility on U.S. soil. In Mezei, the Court leaned heavily into the 
entry fiction doctrine; the justices held that the nearly two-year long 
detention of a noncitizen without a hearing was not unlawful because as an 
entrant, he had no rights conferred upon him, and no protections under the 
Constitution. 126 Additionally, the Court held that neither his physical 
presence on Ellis Island nor his previous residence in the United States 
changed his status, so he remained excludable. 127 
Mezei presents a striking demonstration of the 'plenary power 
doctrine and immigration exceptionalism at work. Where else in American 
legal doctrine would the court authorize indefinite detention based on secret 
evidence, without a hearing? Consider that noncitizens are marched, in 
handcuffs by armed guards, into facilities remarkably resembling prisons, 
but are considered detained under civil, rather than criminal law, which 
118 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1953). 
1 9 Id. at 208. 
20Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 209. 
123 Id. at 213. 
124 Id. 
25 Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez, Invisible Spaces and Invisible Lives in 
ImmigrationDetention, 57 How. L. J. 869, 876 (2014) (discussing the severe drawbacks 
of the current system). 
126 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212-216. 
127 Id. 
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means they are deprived of a host of constitutional guarantees.128 Mezei was 
superseded by statute, but never overturned. 129 In fact, when similar 
circumstances arose decades later in Zadvydas v. Davis, a case about a 
noncitizen being detained after he was ordered removed from the country, 
the Court simply leaned harder into the entry fiction doctrine. 130 There, the 
Court distinguished Zadvydas as being territorially present, and thus subject 
to some protections and due. process rights that Mezei did not receive. 131 
Zadvydas was an important case because it showed the Court departing 
slightly from the plenary power doctrine, but the relief was short lived. A 
later Court, in Jennings v. Rodriguez,132 walked back much of Zadvydas 
without expressly overturning it. 1 3 3 
These are only some of the best-known examples of the 
antidemocratic nature of American immigration law, but there are many 
others. For example, immigration law has been used to restrict the First 
Amendment rights of noncitizens,' 34 as well as their right to due process. 135 
None of these cases has ever been explicitly overturned. Moreover, while 
we have already discussed the legal arguments behind Chae Chan Ping1 36 
and Trump v. Hawaii,137 the through lines between these two cases are well 
worth noting; they are over 100 years apart, but both feature a blanket ban 
based on nationality, with well documented records of animus toward the 
excluded groups, and both imposed exclusion and hardship on lawful 
128 Garret Epps, The FragilityofImmigrants'ConstitutionalProtections,ATLANTIC, Nov. 
7, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/fragility-of-immigrants-
constitutional-protections/601486/. 
129 See Perez v. Decker, No. 18-CV-5279, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141768, at 9 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 20, 2018) (describing the human costs of a heartless system). 
130 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693-94 (2001). 
131 Id. at 693 ("Once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the 
Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, 
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent."). 
132 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
133 See generally Miriam Peguero Medrano, Not Yet Gone, andNot Yet Forgotten: The 
Reasonableness of Continued Mandatory Detention of Noncitizens Without a Bond 
Hearing, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 597 (2018). 
134 See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 595-96 (1952) (holding that 
longtime legal residents of the United States could be deported under an ex postfacto law 
because of their former Communist Party membership). 
"3 See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (holding that 
a German woman could be excluded from the country based on secret evidence without a 
hearing, because Congress had not required one, and, "whatever the procedure authorized 
by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."). 
136 See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text. 
137 See supranotes 36-47 and accompanying text. 
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resident noncitizens. 138 The costumes and the characters may have changed, 
but the plot remains largely the same. 
As shocking as the immigration legal landscape looks, one question 
that many Americans might ask is "Why should we care? We are citizens, 
not immigrants." The problem with that approach is that the behaviors 
enabled under the plenary power doctrine do not stop with noncitizens. 
Instead, the antidemocratic behavior enabled by immigration jurisprudence 
affects the rights and freedoms of everyone in the country; citizens and 
noncitizens alike. For example, the plenary power doctrine and immigration 
exceptionalism have granted federal immigration authorities the power to 
search citizens without warrants at the border, 139 an authority that has been 
invoked to suppress free speech by harassing journalists, lawyers, and 
human rights activists.140 The Court also allows border agents to require 
citizens to submit to vehicle checkpoints in any area within 100 miles from 
the border, and even allows stops based on race. 141 That decision led to 
situations 'where border enforcement agents climbed onto private buses 
demanding proof of citizenship from Black and Brown passengers, many of 
38 Michael Kagan, Is the ChineseExclusion CaseStill GoodLaw? (The PresidentIs Trying 
to Find Out), 1 NEv. L. J. FORuM 80 (2017); Garret Epps, The Ghost of Chae Chan Ping, 
ATLANTIC, Jan. 20, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/ghost-
haunting-immigration/ 51015/. 
139 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004) ("The Government's 
interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the 
international border. Time and again, [the Supreme Court has] stated that 'searches made 
at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by 
stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable 
simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border. Congress, since the beginning of 
our Government, 'has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches 
and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the 
collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country."') 
(internal citations omitted). 
140 Ryan Devereaux, Border Official Admits Targeting Journalists and Human Rights 
Advocates with Smuggling Investigations, INTERCEPT (May 17, 2019, 11:33 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2019/05/17/border-smuggling-journalists-activists/; Seth Harp, 
I'm a JournalistBut I Didn't Fully Realize the TerriblePower of U.S. Border Officials 
Until They Violated My Rights and Privacy, INTERCEPT (June 22, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2019/06/22/cbp-border-searches-journalists/ ( ame). 
"1' United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) ("Routine searches 
of the persons and effects of entrants [into the United States] are not subject to any 
requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant. Automotive travelers may 
be stopped at fixed checkpoints near the border without individualized suspicion even if 
the stop is based largely on ethnicity, and boats on inland waters with ready access to the 
sea may be hailed and boarded with no suspicion whatever.") (internal citations omitted)). 
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whom were citizens.1 42 Moreover, the type of indefinite civil detention that 
the Court normalized in Mezei and reaffirmed in subsequent cases 4 3 was 
used against an American citizen held in custody for over three years 
and he is just one of over 1,000 citizens detained by ICE since 2012.145 
The abuses by border enforcement authorities under cover of law are 
too numerous to list here; racism and cruelty have characterized border 
enforcement since its inception, and their influence remains at present.1 46 
As this brief review shows, the antidemocratic behavior that we authorize 
and normalize against noncitizens will inevitably be unleashed upon 
citizens. What we do to the least of these, we do to ourselves. 
142 Adiel Kaplan & Vanessa Swales, BorderPatrolsearcheshave increasedon Greyhound, 
other buses far from border, NBC NEWS (June 5, 2019, 1:30 AM), 
https://www.nbenews.com/politics/immigration/border-patrol-searches-have-increased-
greyhound-other-buses-far-border-n1012596; Johnny Diaz, Greyhound to Stop Allowing 
Border Patrol Agents on Its Buses Without Warrants, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/22/us/greyhound-border-patrol.html. 
143 See supra notes 116-133 and accompanying text. 
'"Paige St. John & Joel Rubin, Must Reads: ICE held an American man in custodyfor 
1,273 days. He's not the only one who hadto prove his citizenship, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 
2018, https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-citizens-ice-20180427-htmlstory.html 
(discussing the practice of lengthy immigrant detention). 
145 For examples of harsh federal practices see, e.g., Steve Coll, When ICE Tries to Deport 
Americans, Who Defends Them?, NEW YORKER, Mar. 21, 2018, 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/when-ice-tries-to-deport-americans-
who-defends-them; Dustin Dwyer, ICE Tried to Deport This U.S. Citizen and Marine 
Veteran, NPR (Jan. 17, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/17/686188335/ice-
tried-to-deport-this-u-s-citizen-and-marine-veteran; Meagan Flynn, US. citizenfreedafter 
nearly a month in immigration custody, family says, WASH. POsT, July 24, 2019, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/07/23/francisco-erwin-galicia-ice-cpb-us-
citizen-detained-texas/. 
146 See ELIZABETH F. COHEN, ILLEGAL (2020) (describing the gratuitous cruelty in federal 
immigration practice); Greg Grandin, The BorderPatrolHasBeen a CultofBrutalitySince 
1924, INTERCEPT (Jan. 12, 2019, 6:00 AM) https://theintercept.com/2019/01/12/border-
patrol-history/; Alex Horton, A Border Patrolchief in a racistFacebookgroup says she 
didn't realize it was racist, WASH. POST, July 25, 2019, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/07/25/border-patrol-chief-was-member-
racist-facebook-group-says-she-didnt-notice/. 
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IV. Why We Should Permit (Or Encourage) Nationwide 
Injunctions in Immigration Cases 
"As citizens, we mustprevent wrongdoingbecause the worldin which we 
all live, wrong-doer, wrongsufferer andspectator, is at stake." 
- Hannah Arendt 
Nationwide immigration injunctions serve three important 
functions. First, they protect and reinforce our ideals about legal 
representation, and give those who are wronged a voice in court. As a 
democracy, America commits to this principle in several ways: we provide 
criminal defendants with legal representation, regardless of their ability to 
pay; we allow pro se litigants to be heard at every level of our courts; and 
the 1 4 th Amendment guarantees the equal protection of the laws to every 
person within American legal jurisdiction, rather than a particular class of 
people. 
Moreover, nationwide injunctions act as a stabilizing force within 
our democracy, discouraging extremist or unilateral policy making on 
critical issues. This is particularly relevant in immigration, as the policies 
can have drastic consequences for the individuals concerned, up to and 
including death. 
Finally, nationwide injunctions allow America the opportunity to 
reflect, to debate, and publicly decide if we want to be our best or worst 
selves. By their nature and rarity, nationwide injunctions are newsworthy, 
thus bringing what may have been an obscure legal dispute into the public 
forum; this allows citizens to engage with the law, and should they choose, 
to place political pressure on policymakers to avoid antidemocratic 
government actions. 
Consider each of these contentions in further detail. 
A. Nationwide Injunctions Provide Legal Protection to the 
Disenfranchised 
"The bosom ofAmerica is open to receive not only the Opulent and 
respectedStranger, but the oppressedandpersecutedofall Nations and 
Religions; whom we shallwelcome to a participationofall our rightsand 
privileges..." 
- George Washington 
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As mentioned, immigration jurisprudence undermines our 
commitment to due process in many respects. It provides that 'outside of 
the border' of the United States, the government is not bound to behave 
constitutionally, 14 7 and further that noncitizens cannot invoke constitutional 
rights in the same manner that citizens can. 148 But the Constitution is not 
merely a set of rights that an individual must invoke, it is a set of structural 
restrictions on the government, created to provide a sustainable free society. 
Intrinsic in those structural restrictions is a commitment to every person 
being entitled to a day in court. 
Nationwide injunctions extend that commitment to those normally 
outside of the Constitution's protection. Noncitizens, even children, have 
no right to public counsel in many proceedings, 149 thus any argument that 
assumes that injured noncitizens can simply go to court is unfounded. 
Moreover, immigration law is highly sensitive to small administrative rule 
changes that require little oversight, but have a ripple effect that harms 
thousands. For real-world examples, consider the Trump administration 
policy that changed the definition of refugee to exclude thousands of 
previously protected people, 5 0 or another Trump administration policy that 
altered the detainment policy surrounding asylum seekers, which resulted 
in thousands of additional detentions and exacerbated dangerous 
overcrowding problems.151 Practically speaking, those policy changes 
meant that asylum seekers had to, in essence, serve a prison sentence 
because they requested asylum. The previous administration's policy 
allowed them to gain release on bail while their asylum claim was heard. 
The sensitivity to small changes - and the drastic consequences for people 
convicted of no crime are why immigration lawsuits need the ability to 
protect more than one person at a time. 
147 For a discussion of the outside/inside (and constructive outside) fiction, see Zainab A. 
Cheema, A Constitutional Casefor Extending the Due Process Clause to Asylum Seekers: 
Revisiting the Entry Fiction After Boumediene, 87 FORDHAM L. REv. 289 (2018). 
148 See, e.g., Epps, supra note 128; Ilya Somin, Immigration Law Defies the Constitution, 
ATLANTIC, Oct. 3, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/us-
immigration-laws-unconstitutional-double-standards/599140/.
149 See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text. 
10 Kristie De Pena & Matthew La Corte, The Devil is in the Details: Digging Deeper into 
2020 Refugee Resettlement Changes, NISKANEN CENT., Nov. 18, 2019, 
https://www.niskanencenter.org/the-devil-is-in-the-details-digging-deeper-into-2020-
refugee-resettlement-changes/. 
151 Vanessa Romo & Joel Rose, AG Barr Orders Immigration Judges to Stop Releasing 
Asylum-Seekers on Bail, NPR (Apr. 17, 2019, 4:35 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/17/714381003/ag-barr-orders-immigration-judges-to-stop-
releasing-asylum-seekers-out-on-bail. 
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The stakes for noncitizens - detention, deportation, and possibly 
death - are as high as they could be. In a democratic society dedicated to 
due process, everyone in this position should receive the opportunity to 
make a case to avoid those consequences. Yet noncitizens' access to the 
legal system hinges on money, understanding a foreign language, and the 
cooperation of border enforcement officials; meaning that noncitizens do 
not have much legal access at all. Barriers to legal access are compounded 
by a byzantine system that seems designed to make sure that noncitizens 
cannot be found,'5 2 and by border enforcement's constant harassment of 
immigration attorneys that provide pro bono legal services to this group.1 53 
Given their unique circumstances and disadvantages, noncitizens need the 
protection of nationwide injunctions -"de facto class actions" 
because our country does not provide them with a readily accessible path to 
an ordinary class action, or even an individual lawsuit. How can noncitizens 
certify as a class when their own lawyers cannot find them? 
A nationwide injunction may not stop an individual abuse, but it can 
halt systemic changes in policy that harm noncitizens in aggregate numbers. 
It can stop the next administrative rule change or executive order that 
undermines noncitizens' due process rights or otherwise harms them. 
Nationwide injunctions can provide lawyers advocating on behalf of 
noncitizens with a fighting chance. Rather than scrambling to wage a war 
on two fronts (having to mitigate real world harms caused to their clients by 
a policy's implementation, as well as arguing against the policy itself in 
court) the attorneys can focus on simply arguing against policy. This is good 
for our democracy in two ways: 1) it allows for the peaceful resolution of 
seriously harmful policies; and 2) it gives attorneys a chance to push back 
against the antidemocratic forces at work in immigration law. 
The courts are not the answer to every problem in immigration; in 
many cases, they have created or deepened pre-existing problems. But those 
mistakes are no excuse to take tools from judges who are trying to uphold 
our founding ideals of safeguarding life and liberty. By continuing to allow 
152 Dan Canon, A System Designed to Make People Disappear, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2017), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/newsandpolitics/coverstory/2017/04/icedetainees_ente 
r_an_unbelievablycruelsystemdesigned_to_make_them_disappear.html (discussing 
barriers that the immigration system imposes for attorneys and immigration detainees 
wishing to find each other). 
153 Lauren Carasik, The Government is TargetingImmigration Lawyers, Activists, and 
Reporters, BOSTON REV. (Apr. 24, 2019), http://bostonreview.net/global-justice/lauren-
carasik-government-targeting-immigration-lawyers-activists-journalists. 
154 See Morely, supra note 2, at 521-22. 
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district judges to issue nationwide injunctions in immigration cases, we can 
slow the erosion of democratic norms in this area, and, at least temporarily, 
make ourselves live up to them. 
B. Nationwide Injunctions Act as a Political Stabilizer 
"Indeed, it has been saidthatdemocracy is the worstform of Government 
exceptfor all those otherforms that have been triedfrom time to time." 
- Winston Churchill 
Nationwide injunctions are not only a tool to serve the 
disenfranchised, they also serve a critical role in stabilizing, and thus 
keeping healthy, our democracy. To remain healthy and functional, 
democracies require two things from political actors: mutual toleration and 
institutional forbearance.1 5 5 Without them, democracies begin to backslide 
toward autocracy or other undesirable forms of government. 156 
Mutual toleration is the idea that so long as political rivals play by 
constitutional rules, they tacitly agree to accept that each has an equal right 
to exist, compete for power, and govern.15 7 Even in disagreement, the 
opposition is still legitimate.1 58 Mutual toleration expresses a collective 
willingness to agree to disagree. When this norm is weak, a democracy is 
difficult to sustain. 159 This virtue is critical to a healthy and functioning 
democracy, and requires the safeguard of universal judicial injunctions. 
Institutional forbearance is the issue more directly related to the 
universal injunctive power. Institutional forbearance describes the behavior 
of political actors who avoid actions that, "while respecting the letter of the 
law, obviously violate its spirit."' 60 It means that politicians do not use their 
institutional prerogatives to the hilt, even if it is technically legal to do so, 
because doing so imperils the existing system. 161 To conceptualize this, it 
helps to think of democracy as a game that we want to keep playing 
indefinitely. To ensure that the game continues, players must refrain from 
injuring their opponents to the point of incapacitation, or antagonizing them 
1" STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, How DEMOCRACIES DIE 102 (2018) (explaining 
how elected leaders can gradually subvert the democratic process to increase their control). 
156 Id. at 101-102. 
157 Id. at 102. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 104. 
16 Id. at 106. 
161 Id. 
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so much that they refuse to play again.' 62 Any adult who plays a game, 
such as checkers or chess, with a child, understands this rule. In practice, 
this usually means that politicians purposely avoid employing dirty tricks 
or hardball tactics in the spirit of fair play. 163 Institutional forbearance is 
especially important in presidential democracies - without it, they descend 
easily into "deadlock, dysfunction, and constitutional crisis." 164 Acting 
without forbearance is a form of "institutional combat aimed at permanently 
defeating one's partisan rivals - and not caring whether the democratic 
game continues."1 65 
Nationwide injunctions incentivize institutional forbearance and 
legislation over extremist or unilateral executive policymaking. Knowing 
that a president's policy agenda can be stopped in its tracks for being too 
extreme provides a signal to the executive branch, telling it to avoid policies 
that would trigger backlash that would put those policies before the courts. 
To observe this incentivization in action, we need to look no further than 
the procedural history of Trump v. Hawaii.166 As mentioned above, because 
of nationwide injunctions, the ban had to be revised three times in order to 
pass any sort of muster. 167 The final travel ban was still a rabidly anti-
immigrant policy, but it was not as overtly racist as it was to begin with. 
The original ban was the sort of extremist policymaking that sparks 
backlash,1 68 moving the opposing party away from institutional 
forbearance. The anti-immigrant sentiment 169 that empowered the Trump 
campaign was very likely itself a result of backlash17 0 against liberal 
immigration policies that were also universally enjoined, like the DAPA 
162 d. at 107. 
163Id 
'" Id. at 108-09. 
165 Id. at 109. 
166 138 S. Ct. 377. 
167 See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text. 
168 See, e.g., Rachel Levinson-Waldman & Haley Hinkle, The Abolish ICE Movement 
Explained, BRENNAN CENT. (July 30, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
work/analysis-opinion/abolish-ice-movement-explained; Elaine Godfrey, What 'Abolish 
ICE' Actually Means, THE ATLANTIC, July 11, 2018, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/07/what-abolish-ice-actually-
means/564752/ (discussing recent calls to replace the federal deportation system with a 
more humane version ofborder regulation).
169 See supranotes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
170 Editorial Board, Opinion, A conservative backlash threatens immigration reform, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-conservative-
backlash-threatens-immigration-reform/2013/04/28/cOa9fb74-aeb5-11 e2-a986-
eec837b1888bstory.html. 
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program. 171 In both cases, nationwide injunctions blunted the policy efforts 
of the executive branch; presidential policy was either stopped outright, or 
significantly altered from its original guise. 
The specter of a nationwide injunction means that in order to preserve 
their policy agenda intact and avoid a loss of political capital, a president 
would best be served by issuing executive orders with caution and 
moderation, and after consulting with the opposite side. Thus, nationwide 
injunctions shift policymaking incentives, moving the ideal format away 
from unilateral executive directives and toward Congressional egislation, 
where political actors must debate and compromise. Debate and 
compromise lie at the heart of any democracy, and maintaining them is 
critical to keeping the political system sustainable. Shifted incentives do not 
guarantee that policymakers will gravitate toward compromise, but like 
guardrails, levees, or other mitigative measures, a guarantee is not the point. 
The point of mitigation is to make a protected area - in this case, our 
democracy - more resilient. 
C. Nationwide Injunctions Provide America with the Opportunity to 
Avoid Being Its Worst Self 
"As long as my recordstandsinfederal court, anyAmerican citizen can 
be held in prisonor concentrationcamps without trial orhearing. I would 
like to see the government admit they were wrong anddo something about 
it, so this will never happen againto any American citizen of any race, 
creed, or color." 
- Fred Korematsu 
Nationwide injunctions serve a moral function in addition to their 
democratic functions. By their very nature, these injunctions are 
newsworthy and can attract the attention necessary to make American 
citizens reflect and decide whether we genuinely wish to pursue certain 
policies. In that way, they provide a safety valve that steers America away 
from being its worst - its most racist, xenophobic, authoritarian, and cruel 
self by providing a public opportunity for discussion on otherwise 
obscure legal issues. America can be a wonderful place when it wishes to 
be, but at too many historical moments America brought shame onto itself 
through its laws. 172 The courts are often the last stop before we do so, and 
171 See supranotes 28-33 and accompanying text. 
172 See Bender, supranote 17. 
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nationwide injunctions give the courts one last opportunity to stop us from 
going over the edge. 
When the courts fail, we end up with stains on our national 
character. One such case, Korematsu v. United States, will do so for all 
time. 17 3 Korematsu, like many immigration cases, affected citizens and 
noncitizens alike, and in modern immigration cases, its themes are still with 
us,1 74 as Justice Sonia Sotomayor explained in Trump v. Hawaii: 
As here, the Government invoked an ill-defined national 
security threat to justify an exclusionary policy of sweeping 
proportion... As here, the exclusion order was rooted in 
dangerous stereotypes about, inter alia, a particular group's 
supposed inability to assimilate and desire to harm the 
United States... As here, the Government was unwilling to 
reveal its own intelligence agencies' views of the alleged 
security concerns to the very citizens it purported to 
protect... And as here, there was strong evidence that 
impermissible hostility and animus motivated the 
Government's policy. 175 
Even though the Muslim Ban was upheld, nationwide injunctions, 
combined with widespread political protests, stopped its implementation in 
its most animus-driven form. American history might have been 
permanently altered for the better if Fred Korematsu's case had received the 
same rigorous attention. Rather than making us wait decades to admit that 
we made the wrong choice, nationwide injunctions give citizens the 
opportunity to organize protests and exert political pressure to protect 
vulnerable groups. Like all safety valves, this one may not always work, but 
it is better to have one and not need it, than to need one and not have it. 
Our democracy needs judges to maintain this injunctive power in 
order to help us help ourselves. This power is necessary at the district court 
level, rather than waiting for years to be enacted at the Circuit or Supreme 
Court level, because "justice too long delayed is justice denied."1 76 Unlike 
'73 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
174 Philip Bump, How a 1944 decision on Japanese internment affected the Supreme 
Court's travel ban decision, WASH. POST, June 26, 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/ 2 018/06/26/how-a-1944-decision-on-
japanese-internment-affected-the-supreme-courts-travel-ban-decision/. 
175 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2447 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
176 Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), in WHY WE 
CAN'T WAIT 77 (1964) (articulating a classic defense of nonviolent resistance). 
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the government, noncitizens typically lack the resources to go straight to the 
Supreme Court with their requests for relief.177 
Might nationwide injunctions backfire and be used by government 
to deprive states and locales interested in putting in place experimental or 
new measures to assist and welcome new immigrants? This is possible,17 8 
but not very likely. As we have seen, ordinarily it is the federal government 
that backs harshly anti-immigrant policies and procedures, with private 
citizens, attorneys, or occasionally sympathetic ities or states taking action 
such as offering sanctuary179 or permission to practice law 10 or attend a 
public university. 181The federal government has many other tools to handle 
such openly pro-immigrant measures when they arise, including simply 
ignoring them. Going to court to ask for a nationwide injunction against a 
small, localized practice that does not threaten a national catastrophe would 
probably strike most judges as overkill. This is particularly so because such 
an injunction would not appear necessary to advance any of the policy goals 
of nationwide injunctions mentioned above, including providing citizens 
remedies for harm,Is2 providing a stable barrier against governmental over-
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https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/the-supreme-court-is-trumps-
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reach, 183 and offering citizens an opportunity to discuss unwise and cruel 
laws before they go into effect.1 84 
Conclusion 
"With greatpower, comes greatresponsibility." 
- Stan Lee 
Some would assert that our judiciary simply calls "balls and 
strikes."1 85 That is a pleasant fantasy, but little more than that. Judges are 
policymakers with immense power: they can turn the tide of society against 
segregation and discrimination,1 86 or they can undermine voting rights and 
give political advantages to the partisans of their choice.1 87 They can even 
decide presidential elections, thus changing the course of history.1 88 A 
tiger's bite does not become any less deadly by claiming that its fangs don't 
exist; judicial policymaking does not lose its impact simply because judges 
claim that they lack that power. 
The judiciary, as policymakers, and as a co-equal branch of 
government, is every bit as responsible for strengthening and upholding our 
democracy as legislators or executives. One ofthe tools that they can use is 
the issuance of nationwide injunctions, which enable them to protect 
vulnerable classes of people from antidemocratic policies--though, to be 
sure, they should be used sparingly and responsibly. Eliminating this power 
to protect our democracy and to protect vulnerable groups like noncitizens 
abdicates the responsibility of the judiciary to act as a shield against 
injustice. And the resulting errors that such an abdication enables will stain 
us, just as Korematsu does. 
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